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We examine the relationship between income growth and saving using bothcross-country
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predictably higher income growth save more than households with predictably low growth. We
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that a model of consumption with habit formation may. The positive effect of growth on saving
implies that previous estimates of the effect of saving on growth may be overstated.
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and NBER1. Introduction
In this paper we re-examine therelationship between the
rate of income growth and the saving rate. Therecent literature
on economic growth has found that countries withhigher saving
or investment rates have tended to have highergrowth rates (see
Levine and Renelt, 1992, for a review). Thisfinding has been
interpreted as being consistent with either the traditional Solow
(1956) growth model, in which higher saving leads tohigher
level of income per capita in steady state(and thus to higher
growth rates on the transition path), or with the TMnewgrowth
models" of Romer and others in whichhigher saving leads to a
permanently higher rate of growth.
An obvious problem in interpreting the resultsof a
regression of growth on saving is that the level ofgrowth may
itself affect the saving rate. Modigliani(1970) showed many
years ago that a very simple version of the Life Cycle model can
predict that high growth causes high saving, and he found
empirical support for the theoretical prediction using cross-
country data. More recently, Baumol, Blackman, and Wolfe
(1991), Deaton and Paxson (1992), and Bosworth (1993) have
also provided evidence that growthmay produce saving. This
paper explores the empirical relationship between saving and
growth using both aggregate and household data, and from a
variety of different perspectives. We consistently find evidence
1that higher income growth producesgreater saving. We then
argue that our results are not consistent with a strict
interpretation of the usual models of consumption and growth,
and we consider several alternatives.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we begin by confirming Modigliani's empirical finding that
countries which have high growth also have high saving. We
then examine the predictions of the neoclassical model for the
relation between saving and growth. We show that in that
model, exogenous increases in growth make subsequent saving
fall, while exogenous increases in saving make subsequent
growth rise. We then examine the empirical links between
saving and growth within individual countries over time. We
fmd that increases in growth are followed by increases insaving -
- aresult that is not consistent with either of the theoretical
predictions from the neoclassical model.
In Section 3, we turn to household-level data which are
not bedeviled by the general equilibrium effects that cloud
aggregate tests. We use three different data sets, and use both
the saving rate and the wealthlincome ratio as our dependent
variables. Using this data we also fmd that saving is positively
correlated with income growth.
In section 4 we discuss the implications of these results
for the theory of consumption. In looking for explanations of the
2positive effect of growth on saving in bothhousehold and
aggregate data, we are guided by Occam's Razor:a single
explanation that encompasses both phenomena ispreferable to
.separate explanations for each of the two. We discuss theability
of consumption modelsincorporating uncertainty and liquidity
constraints to explain our findings, and concludethat they axenot
sufficient to do the job. We thenargue that our results might
stem from habit formation behavior inconsumption, although it
appears that the degree of habit persistence required toexplain
our results is rather high. Section Five concludes.
2. Growth and saving at theaggregate level
2.1 Facts on the long termrelationship between saving and
growth
We begin by examining the empiricalrelationship between
growth rates and saving rates incross-country data. We use two
samples of countries in our work. We started with the Summers
and Heston (1991) Mark 5dataset, and then excluded all
countries whose data received a grade of lower than "C-."We
further excluded communist countries, countries whose
economies were dominated by oil production, and countries with
1985 populations of less than one million. Theremaining sample
consisted of 64 countries; we call this our "full"sample. Our
3second sample is the 22 members of the OECD with. 1985
populations greater than one million.
Table 1 presents simple cross sectional regressions of
national saving rates' on growth, bothincluding and excluding
the initial log of outputper capita from the right hand side.
These regressions resemble the "growth regressions"presented
by Barro (1991), among many others, except that we have made
saving the dependent variable and growth an independent variable
rather than the reverse. Ofcourse, putting saving on the left
hand side does notprove that causation runs from. growth to
saving any more than putting growth on the left hand sideproves
that causation runs from saving to growth.2
When growth alone is the right hand side variable, it
'The measure we examine is nominal nationalsaving as a
fraction of nominal national income.Unlike measures of
investment, our measure is not affected by differences in the
relative price of investment goods examinedby DeLong and
Summers (1991). An exact description of ourmeasure of saving
can be found in the data appendix.
2King and Levine (1993) run regressions similar toours, with
growth rates on the right hand side and investment as the
dependent variable. Their results are consistent with a model in
which growth rates differ exogenously across countries and in
which investment acts to keep the capitalloutput ratioconstant.
They argue that this model, rather than causation running from
investment to growth,may be the explanation for the observed
correlation between investment and growth.
4enters significantly in the full sample and with a t-statistic of 1.65
in the OECD sample. The correlations betweenaverage growth
and average saving are .35forthe OECD and .26 for the full
sample. When the log of income per capita in 1960 is partialled
out, there is a very significant relation between growth and
saving in the OECD sample, and a borderline significant relation
in the full sample.
In Table 2, we look at the relation between growth and
saving within countries over time by running panel regressions
using the Summers and Heston data. For each country we look
at non-overlapping five-year avenges of growth and savings
rates. We use data from 1958-1987, giving a maximum (if there
are not missing years) of six observations for each country. By
taking five year averages we hope to avoid picking up business-
cycle frequency relations between growth and saving. In all
regressions we include a full set of country dummies on the right
hand side, and in addition we experiment with controlling for the
log of initial income per capita during the period and allowing for
a full set of time period effects. In the full sample, the growth
rate is always significant, while in the OECD sample the growth
rate is significant so long as either year effects or the log of
output is included.
Ours is by no• means the first evidence suggesting a
powerful link from income growth to saving. Modigliani (1970)
5found results similar to those in our Table 1 long ago. More
recently, in a comprehensive study of the determinants of saving
rates in the OECD countries in the period from the 1960s to the
1980s, Bosworth (1993) found that the growth rate of income
was the most important determinant of saving. Looking over
longer spans of time, Maddison (1992) also finds a positive
relation between saving and growth. For the seven countries for
which data are available for the period 1870-1913, the correlation
between saving and growth rates is .58.Forthe six countries
for which data is available for the period 19 14-1950, the
correlation is .67. Another important result that comes from
Maddison's work is that Kuznets' (1946) finding that the saving
rate in the United States had been relatively constant for the last
century represents something of an outlier. Of the eleven
countries for which Maddison presents long time series on
saving, the U.S. is the only one in which the saving rate does not
show a significant increase over time. The U.S. is also the only
country which experienced almost no increase in the growth rate
of output over the 120 year period which Maddison examines.
2.2 What does theory predict?
As we remarked earlier, Modigliani (1970, and many
other places) has argued that the positive cross-sectional
Saving data for India are for the period 1890-1913.
6association of saving and income growth is evidence in favorof
the Life Cycle model of saving. Modigliani notes that ifthere
were no productivity growth across generations, andno
population growth, the saving of the young would exactly balance
the dissaving of the old, and the net nationalsaving rate would
be zero. Because productivity growth makes theyoung richer
than the old, the young will be saving more than the oldare
dissaving (assuming the saving rate of the young is the same as
the rate at which the current old saved at when theywere young).
A peculiar feature Modigliani's model, however, is that
he assumes that the income growth rate for individualconsumers
is no higher in a high-growtheconomy than in a low-growth
economy. Aggregate income growth is the result of increasing
the level of the lifetime income profile forsucceeding
generations. In other words, in Modigliani's framework there
would be no reason to expect that the growth rate of income for
an individual Japanese worker over the last 40 years was any
greater than the growth rate of income for a British worker of the
same age.
Carroll and Summers (1991) muster arange of evidence
against this description of the relationship between aggregate and
individual income growth. Theyargue that a better description
is that household income growth g is equal to aggregate income
growth g plus adjustments for seniority, occupation, and other
7individual-specific factors,;.
If household income growth is given byg g + e1, an
exogenous increase in aggregate growth g will make every
household want to consume more and save less. As notedby
Tobin (1967), under reasonableparameter values this effect
typically outweighs Modigliani's aggregation effect so that the
predicted correlation between aggregate income growth and
saving becomes negative. Thus, even without augmenting the
model with general equilibrium effects, the model'sprediction
about the correlation betweenaggregate saving and growth is
ambiguous.
The Life Cycle model produces much cleaner implications
for the relation between growth and saving at the household level
than at the aggregate level, so we willpostpone further
discussion of that model until we have presented the household
level evidence. In the remainder of this section of thepaper we
will examine the standard neoclassical model ofoptimal growth,
in which analysis of general equilibrium effects isat least
somewhat manageable.
2.2.1 The relation between saving andgrowth in the
neoclassical model
We consider a standard, closed-economy neoclassical
model of optimal growth. Utility in each period is givenby a
8constant relative risk aversion utility function, and consumption
is equal to the level that would be chosen by a social planner
maximizing the discounted sum of future utility:
(1)
where pisthe coefficient of relative risk aversion, and fiisthe
discount factor equal to 11(1+0), where 0 is the discount rate.
We assume that production is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns
to scale, that labor is supplied inelastically, and that there is no
population growth. We also assume exogenous technological
growth at rate X. Output is thus
Y=AextKtLtlm (2)
Capital accumulation is given by
(3)
where d is the rate of depreciation.
In the steady state, the growth rate of income in this
model is determined by the technological growth parameter X and
9does not dependonthe saving rate. In the short- and medium-
run, however, there are several different channels through which
saving and growth are related, and the sign andmagnitude of the
correlation between the two aretheoretically ambiguous.
The most intuitive channel is the directrelation between
saving, capital accumulation, and the level ofincome, embodied
in equations (2) and (3). Givenan initial level of capital and
output, exogenously higher saving will lead to highercapital
accumulation and so higheroutput growth in the short- to
medium-run.This is the linkage fromsaving to growth
examined in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil(1992) among many
other papers in which the long-termsaving rate is treated as an
independent variable. We will refer to thisas the "mechanical
link" from saving to growth. Thelength of time over which this
link is important dependson the weight of capital in the
production function. If there are constant returns tocapital, as
suggested by Romer (1987), then the effect of savingon growth
lasts indefinitely. If capital is lessimportant, the effect can be
short lived. Mankiw, Romer, arid Well showthat, taking the
saving rate as exogenous, the half-life of deviations ofoutput
from the steady state level isinversely proportional to. (1-a).
In a model in which consumption is determinedby
forward-looking consumers, however, a powerful link between
growth and consumption runs in the opposite direction.If
10growth is exogenously higher, then, ceterisparibus, forward-
looking consumers will feel wealthier and will spend more and
save less. We will call this the "human wealth link" from
expected growth to saving.
A third set of links arises indirectly as a result of the
relationship between interest rates and consumption. If countries
have identical preferences and technologies but differ in their
initial capital endowments, then poor countries should have both
high growth rates and high interest rates.Traditional
consumption analysis fmds that higher interest rates affect
consumption through the substitution effect (which raises saving),
the income effect (which lowers saving), and the human wealth
effect (which raises saving). The net sign of these effects
depends on parameter values, but Summers (1981) has argued
that for plausible parameter values the model implies that the
interest elasticity of saving should be strongly positive. This
should be particularly true for the effect of temporarily high
interest rates as would be found in a country that was growing
rapidly following a shock. We will refer to the net effect of
higher interest rates on consumption as the "interest rate effect"
on saving.4
4The analysis of the model presented here is for a closed
economy. In the case of an economy open to aworld capital
market, the influences leading to a negative relation between
income and saving would be stronger. In particular, while the
11The parameters of the model determine the strength of the
various linkages.In particular, p,theinverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, governs the strength of the
interest rate effect. If p is low (the intertemporal elasticity is
high), then consumers will be more willing to postpone
consumption today in order to enjoy more consumption
tomorrow, so the interest rate effect on consumption will be
large. In the experiments below, we consider values of pofone
(log utility) and four. Log utility is often used in analyzing
consumption models because it has convenient analytical
properties. However, empirical evidence appears to indicate
higher values of p,andour second choice of four lies at the low
end of many empirical estimates.5
Another important parameter is a, the exponent on capital
in the production function, which determines the extent to which
a lower capital stock will raise of the rate of return on capital,
which in turn raises the rates of saving and growth. King and
Rebelo (1993) show that for low values of a, the implied interest
rates when output is well below its steady state level are quite
human wealth effect of future wages on consumption would still
be present, neither the mechanical link from saving to growth nor
the interest rate effect would be operative in such an economy.
Hall (1988) found a minimum estimated value of 5forp
using U.S. aggregate data; Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) found a
minimum value of 6 using household data.
12high. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) argue that for an
extendeddefinitionof capital that includes human capital,avalue
of a of two-thirds is appropriate. This is thevaluethatwe use
in our simulations.
Because of the multiple and countervailing influences
linking growth and saving, the relationship betweenthetwo that
one should expect to observe in aggregate data is crucially
dependent on the sources of variation across countries. We
consider two experiments which demonstrate this point. The first
is a shock to the discount rate, e.Weassume that a country is
in steady state with discount rate of 4%. In yearzero, the
discount rate is lowered to 3%. Although we do not think that
people's discounting of future utility is really subject to abrupt
exogenous changes, changing the discount rate can proxy for
other changes that might affect countries. A plausible story
about economic development, for instance, might hold that
development can begin when a country's government realizes the
long-term benefits of increased saving and embarks on a national
program of saving and investment explicitly designed to achieve
growth by exploiting the mechanical link between saving and
growth. The simplest way to model such a shift might be as a
change in the country's discount rate.6
6Inpractice this experiment is identical to those considered
by King and Rebelo (1993), in which countries start off with
13Figure 1 shows the results of this experiment graphically.
When p =1,the saving rate increases by 7 percentage points
immediately, and gradually declines toward a new permanent
level that is approximately 5pointshigher than before. The
annual growth rate leaps up to about 2.8 percent and then
declines relatively rapidly back toward its 2 percent equilibrium.
When p =4(the bottom two panels) the saving rate increases by
little more than 1 percentage point, but does not change
significantly thereafter, while the growth rate of income jumps to
2 1/4percentand then gradually declines back toward 2 percent.
In both cases, then, the increase in saving is associated with a
substantial and long-lasting subsequent increase in growth.
The second experiment we consider is further outside the
traditional growth literature: a change in the exogenous rate of
technological progress, X. Although we doubt that countries can
be viewed as having permanent differences in their growth rates
of technology, the growth experiences of a number of countries
seem to be characterized by changes in broadly defined
technology (including property rights, the degree and nature of
government interference in markets, and restrictions on trade).
A salient example is the current period of rapid growth in
mainland China, which has been spurred by continuing movement
toward a market economy.
capital below their steady state levels.
14The experiment we consider is a change in X for a country
that is initially in steady state. We consider a country with an
initial technology growth rate of .02, in which the growth rate is
raised to .03. The results are presented in Figure 2. The
change in the growth rate of technology produces a rising path in
the growth rate of output. Output does not initially grow at the
new rate of technology growth because the stock of capital per
efficiency unit is initially higher than in the steady state. In the
case where p =1, the transition to the new growth rate is fairly
rapid: the growth rate has risen to 2.5% within 11 years of the
shock, and to 2.75% within 26 years. In the case where p =4,
the transition is slower: growth rises to 2.5% after only 31 years,
and to 2.75% after 60 years.
The behavior of the saving rate here is qualitatively
different from that in the previous experiment. In the case where
p =1, saving drops immediately, then begins rising, but remains
lower than its initial level for eight years. Thus, at least in the
medium run, the relationship between saving and growth is
negative. Also, the movement of the saving rate is fairly small
in comparison to the movement of the growth rate: moving
"Althoughthe experiment that we consider here is a
permanent change in the growth rate of technology, wealso
could have considered a temporary change in X. For changes in
X lasting for a sufficiently long time, the results would be
similar.
15between the steady state where growth is 2 percent and the steady
state where growth is 3 percent, the saving rate only rises from
42.0% to 44.0%. In the case where p=4,thesaving rate falls
in response to an increase in the growth rate and remains roughly
constant below its initial level. In this case the consumption
smoothing effect dominates the substitution effect of higher
interest rates.Thus, for both values of p the medium-mn
relationship between growth and saving is negative, and if p=4
the long-run relationship is negative as well.8
The simulations presented above are similar to King and
Rebelo's (1993) analysis of the neoclassical model. In their
model, as well as in Christiano (1989), countries which start out
with capital stocks well below their steady state levels experience
both rapid growth and high saving. This high saving is in turn
a product of high interest rates, which compensate for the
depressing influence on saving of the human wealth effect in the
presence of rapidly growing income. For example, in King and
Rebelo's simulations, annual real interest rates can be higher than
50%.Butin fact, interest rates to savers in many rapidly
Viard (1993), working analytically with a linearized version
of the neoclassical growth model, reaches a similar conclusion
about the effects of changes in growth rates on saving. He
argues that the failure of saving rates to rise in response to the
post-1973 productivity slowdown, despite the fact that published
forecasts of future long-term growth declined dramatically, is
strong evidence against the Permanent Income Hypothesis.
16growing countries have been surprisingly thw.9Thus,we
believe that the high saving rates of rapidly growing countries
such as Japan remain unexplained by the neoclassical model.
We tsike this exploration of the neoclassical model to have
shown that, although the "mechanical link" from saving to
growth is capable of generating a medium-run positive
relationship between saving and growth, the "human wealth" link
from growth to saving means that exogenousincreases ingrowth
can be associated with declines in saving, at least over the
medium run. Our next task is to test whether either of these
theoretical links between saving and growth can be found in the
data.
2.3Granger Causality results
In the theoretical model presented above, when there is a
change in one of the parameters, both growth and saving change
immediately. In applying the model to the data we might expect
to see a less simultaneous movement. If, for example, it takes
some time to adjust consumption to its new optimal level
following a shock to growth, or if it takes time for consumers to
Christiano reports that the return to the Japanese stock
market in the 1960's and 70's was roughly as high as the return
to capital in his calibrated growth model, but given that most
Japanese household saving is not in the stock market, it is not
clear why this return is the right measure on which to focus.
17understand that a shock has occurred, then when Xchanged, we
might expect to see the growth rate of output change first,
followed by a change in the saving rate.Similarly, given that
investment takes time to become productive, we mightexpect to
see a change in the discount rate reflected first in a change in
saving, and only later in a change in growth.
It is in this spirit that we look more closely at the timing
of movements of saving and growth within countries. The first
experiment above suggested that if there are shocks to the
discount rate, then we would expect saving toGranger cause
growth, with a positive sign. If there are shocks to X, the growth
rate of technology, then at least in the medium run we would
expect growth to Granger cause saving, with a negative sign --
thesecond experiment.
The data that we examine are the panel ofnon-
overlapping five-year avenges of saving and growth examined in
Table 2.Table 3 reports the results of our basic Granger
causality tests.All regressions include a fUll set ofcountry
dummies --thuswe are taking out the effect of cross-country
differences in avenge rates of growth and saving. In addition,
in some regressions we included a set of time period dummies,
and report the p-value for the test that the set of dummies is
equal to zero.
In the top panel of the table, we present regressions of
18saving on lagged saving and lagged growth. In the OECD
sample, lagged growth enters positively and significantly when
year effects are excluded from the regression. When year effects
are included,the coefficienton lagged growth falls only slightly
butbecomesinsignificant, while theyeareffects are jointly
insignificant. In the broad sample of countries, lagged growth is
always positive and significant.'°
The bottom panel of Table 3 tests whether saving Granger
causes growth. When year effects are excluded, saving enters
negatively and significantly in both samples. When year effects
are included, however, the coefficient on saving is reduced and
becomes insignificant. Table 4 repeats our basic regressions
using differenced data. That is, the change in saving between
periods t- 1 and t is regressed on the changes in saving and in
growth between t-2 and t-1. In this table, the only significant
result is that in the Full sample of countries, changes in the
growth rate Granger cause changes in the saving rate with a
positive sign.
The most surprising result of these exercises is that
growth Granger causes saving with a positive sign. This finding
is consistent with our cross country findings in Tables 1 and 2,
but not with the consumption model underlying the neoclassical
'°Deatonand Paxson (1992) fmd similar results examining
time series data from Taiwan.
19growth model. The second experiment above showed that, if
changes in growth rates are expected to persist, changes in
growth. should have a negative effect on saving, at leastover the
medium-run time frame considered here.
The second empirical result, that to the extent that there
is any causality running from saving to growth, it is with a
negative sign, is also interesting. This result is inconsistent with
the common view that the reason cross—country regressions show
a positive association between saving and growth is that high
saving produces high growth via the mechanical link from saving
to capital and capital to output. On the other hand, this result
may not be inconsistent with the optimal growth model if
consumers have advance knowledge about income growth rates.
The logic is that of Campbell (1987), who argues that
consumption should go down in advance of a decline in income
if the income drop was anticipated (this is just the human wealth
effect on consumption).Examining quarterly U.S. data,
Campbell confirms the prediction that saving Granger causes
income growth with a negative sign. A problem with Campbell's
results, however, was that they could have been produced by a
Keynesian model with completely myopic consumers whose
consumption function was subject to stochastic shocks. A
positive shock to saving would reduce aggregate demand and
therefore cut income in subsequent quarters.Over longer
20horizons such as our five year periods the aggregate demand
effect of increased saving should be attenuated, but the
mechanical link between saving and growth should begin to bite,
leaving the net prediction of the model ambiguous.
Our conclusion is that neither of the simple causal
linkages between growth and saving explored in our theoretical
experiments explains our data,1' but there is nevertheless an
important empirical linkage: higher growth leads to higher
saving.
2.4Single Country Case Studies
As another way of looking at the relationship between
saving and growth in aggregate data, we examine data from
individual countries. We focus on a set of high-saving, high-
growth East Asian countries whose experiences have been crucial
in shaping the growth literature. For example, excluding Japan
from the saving regression for the OECD sample in the second
column of Table 1 reduces the coefficient on growth from 4.73
(standard error of 1.23) to 3.34 (1.55). Similarly, excluding
"To avoid misinterpretation, we should emphasize that,
despite the results of Tables 3 and 4, we both still believe that an
exogenous increase in the saving rate would lead to an increase
in economic growth. The argument here is only that the
observed pattern of data could not have been generated by a
neoclassical model in which the primary shocks were exogenous
changes in the saving rate.
21Japan, Hong Kong, and South Korea from the regression for the
full sample in the fourth column reduces the coefficient on
growth from 1.06 (.54) to .62 (.69).
In Figures Three through Six we look directly at data
from Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong, to see
what can be learned about the relation between saving and
growth.'2 For each country we plot time series of centered
three-year averages of the growth rate and the saving rate. The
message of these four figures is, to us, fairly unambiguous: in all
four cases, growth was high early, and saving was high later. In
South Korea, for example, over the period 1960-74, growth
averaged 6.1 % while avenge saving was only 10.4%. Over the
period 1975-87, growth avenged 5.3%,whilesaving averaged
27.8%. In none of the countries does it appear to be the case
that large increases in the saving rate were reflected in
subsequent high growth.
The data from these countries are consistent with our
Granger causality results that high growth is followed by, rather
than preceded by, high saving. Since these countries are to such
a large extent the determinants of the cross-country result that
growth and saving are highly correlated, this examination of
12 Data is from Summers and Heston(1991). See the Data
Appendix for the definition of saving. Singapore is not included
in the regressions in Table 1 because it does not have data for all
of the years 1960-87.
22time-series data casts further doubt on theconventionally
acceptedwisdom that the growth-saving correlation is drivenby
causality running from saving to growth.'3
2.5 Conclusionsfrom the Aggregate Evidence
The recentliteratureoneconomiógrowth has typically
explained the positive correlation between saving and growth as
the result of high saving producing high growth viacapital
accumulation. Our empirical results suggest, however, that
higher growth precedes higher saving. Furthermore, higher
saving isnot followedby higher growth, at least in the medium
run. If our evidence is convincing, it has implications for both
the theory of consumption and for the analysis of economic
growth. We address these implications in Sections Four and
Five, respectively. Before doing so, however, we examine the
relation between saving and growth in household level data,
where the general equilibrium effects that bedevil analysis of
aggregate level data are not present.
some of the countries we examine, high growth seems to
produce no only a high saving rate, but a constantly rising saving
rate.Although it is probably true that no simple model can
explain all that is going on in these countries, the partial
equilibrium habit formation model that we present below can
produce such a phenomenon in some cases. See in particular
Figure lib.
233. The Household Evidence
In this section we turn to household-leveldata to examine
the relationship between incomegrowth and saving.The
question we hope to answer by looking at householddata is
whether people who havepredictably high income growth save
more or less than people who havepredictably low income
growth. To address our question we use data fromthree
household surveys, the Panel Studyof Income Dynamics (PSID),
the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances(SCE), and the 196 1-62
Consumer &penditure Survey (CEX). Thebasic technique will
be to construct estimates ofpredicted income growth for each
household based on theage, occupation, and education of the
household head. We then construct estimatesof the saving rate
or the wealth/income ratio for each family, and thenregress this
measure on predicted income growth. In all three data sets
we fmd a highly statistically significantpositive relationship
between saving or wealth andpredictable income growth. We
also find that the level ofsaving or wealth is positively related to
the level of permanent income, buteven controlling for the effect
of permanent income onsaving we generally fmd that households
with predictablygreater income growth save more.
3.1 The PSID Evidence
Our extract from the PSID contains dataon income for a
24sample of households from 1968 through 1987. Although there
is no direct measure of the saving rate in thesurvey, in 1984
householdswere surveyedabout their wealth holdings.
Abstracting from capital gains and losses,wealthmust come
either from saving by the household itself or from transfers of
wealthfromother households. We restrict our sample to
households which have never received an inheritance, and inter
vivos transfers are included in our definition of household
income, so observed wealth in 1984 for our sample of households
should correspond at least roughly to past saving out of total
income. We further restricted our sample to households with
heads between the ages of 30 and 40 in order to examine
households an early stage of the life cycle when the predictions
of consumption models are clearest. (See Section Four for an
overview of those theoretical predictions.)
We base our crude saving measure for each household on
the ratio of wealth at the end of 1983 to avenge income over the
198 1-1987 period for the household. Since wealth/income ratios
appear to be approximately lognormally distributed over most of
their range, we wanted to take the log. However, net worth is
zero or negative for about 5-10 percent of the sample, precluding
a logarithmic specification. Our solution was to add one to the
WIY ratio before taking the log. Thus, our dependent variable
is S =log(W/Y+ 1).
25We observeincomein each year for each household.To
avoid conceptual problems associatedwith changes in marital
status we restricted thesample to households whose maritalstatus
djd not change over theperiod. Because the income of farmers
and the self-employed is muchmore variable, and more difficult
to measure correctly, than that ofpeople in other occupations, we
excluded the self-employed andfarmers from all our results.
After dropping observations withmissing wealth, education, or
occupation information, and makinga few other sample
restrictions (see the dataappendix for details), we were left with
a total of 287 observations.
Before turning to the econometricestimates, we present
some simple plots of the data.Figure 7a plots the avenge values
of the growth rate of incomeand of our S variable by education
group for our PSID sample. We could havesimply plotted the
six (growth, wealth) combinationsfor the six educationgroups,
but if we had done so it wouldnot have been possible by looking
at the graph to tell howmany households were in each of the six
education groups. Therefore foreach educationgroup we plotted
a cloud of points randomly distributedaround the groupmean,
where the number of points in thecloud was equal to the number
of households in thegroup. The figure shows a strong positive
association between incomegrowth and the wealthlincome ratio
across people in different educationgroups. The next figure
26performs the same experiment using the sixoccupational
categories we consider, and also shows astrong positive
relationship between growth and saving.
We turn now to more formaleconometric tests. The
prototype equation we wish to estimate in all three datasetsis:
S=6o+61gt6Q÷e (4)
or,combining a constant, g, and Qintoa matrix X:
SXÔ+e (5)
whereS is the measure of saving,g is the predictable component
of income growth, and Qisa set of other variables that might
plausibly be related to the saving rate. Specializing thisequation
tothePSWcase,Swfflbelog1,y+ l)andgwillbethe
predicted growth rate of income. The key coefficient,ö, shows
the effect of income growth onSaving.
We do not observe households' predictions forincome
growth directly. What we do observe, the actual growth rate of
income for each household over the 1981-1987period, is
presumably the sum of the predictable component of income
growth and an error term. If we were to perform regression (4)
using actual income growth, therefore, we wouldexpect the
coefficient on S to be biased.If the prediction error were
27uncorrelated with saving, this would bea classic errors-in-
variables problem, and owouldbe biased downward.If,
however, the prediction error representedtransitory shocks to
income, the LC/PIH model would imply thatalmost all of the
shock should be saved, i.e. theerror would be positively
correlated with S. This amounts toa simultaneity problem.
The solution to both errors-in-variablesand simultaneity
problems is to estimate the equation using instrumentalvariables.
The instruments used are thesame education and occupation
variables used for the plots above,along with the age of the
household head. In our basicspecification, the only control
variable in Qisthe age of the household head.
The results are presented in Table 5.Regression (1) finds
that the coefficient on incomegrowth is 4.69 with a
heteroskedasticityrobust standard error of1.57, which is
significant at better than the 1percent level. This coefficient
implies that a one percentage point increase inthe predictable
growth rate of income would produce an almost 5percentage
point increase in the wealth/income ratio.
Using education and occupation as instruments in
regression (1) implicitly assumes that theonly channel through
which occupation and education affectwealth is through their
effect on the growth rate of income.One might suspect that
education and occupation are correlated withsaving through other
28channels as well. For example, ifpeople with higher permanent
incomes save more, ceterisparibus, andif education and
occupation are correlated with the level ofpermanent income,
then the identification assumptions of the modelin regression (1)
are wrong and the coefficient on the incomegrowth term could
be biased.
Hansen's (1982) test ofoveridentifying restrictions is
designed to detect precisely this kind of problem. Wetherefore
present the p-value for the test of overidentifying restrictions for
our model in the second-to-last column of Table 5.Thep-value
of .08 rejects the specification at the 10percent level, suggesting
that our instruments do indeed havesome explanatory power for
wealth independent of their ability topredict income growth. We
therefore added to our specification the natural controlvariable
suggested above: income. Regression (2) of Table Spresents the
results when the log ofaverage 1981-1987 income is added to
regression (1).This specification appears to fit the data
substantially better than the specification of regression (1): the
OlD test now passes at a significance level of.35,andthe
coefficient on income growth is reduced but stillsignificant at the
10 percent level.
3.2 The SCF and the Pooled PSID/SCF Evidence
The PSID was not designed to collect data on wealth, and
29although some studies have found that thewealth data in the
sm are reasonablygood (see, for example, Curtin,Juster, and
Morgan (1989)), it would lend credenceto our PS1Dresultsif we
found similar evidence ina survey explicitly designed tomeasure
wealth. We therefore turnedto the 1983 Survey ofCoMwner
Financesof the Federal Reserve Boardto conduct further tests.
The SCF is deficient relativeto the PSID in onerespect,
however: it contains dataon only a singleyear of income. It
would therefore be difficult toconstruct an estimate of expected
income growth usingonly data from within the SCF(although
not impossible; see below for thediscussion of our income
growth estimates in the CEX). Oursolution was to estimate the
relationship between incomegrowth and the instruments
(education, occupation, and age) in thePSID, and then to use the
PID income growthequation to predict income growth for the
SC? consumers.This amounts torunning the first stage
regression of a Two Stage LeastSquares estimation in the PSID
and the secondstage regression in the SCF, a procedurewe call
Two Sample Two Stage LeastSquares (TS2SLS). (This is a
specialization of the Two SampleInstrumental Variables (TSIV)
technique described in Angrist andKrueger, 1990. See the
technical appendix for details of theestimation procedure).
To be concrete, callour instrument set Z, where Z
contains the education,occupation, and age variables described
30above. Thegoal is toe ôintheequations =Xô+ e
even though we do not observe X (or atany rate all elements of
X) in the SCF. However, we do observe thevalues of
instruments Z, and we can estimate thefollowing (first stage)
regression in the PSI]):
X=Zcx+y (6)
Estimating a in this equation yields:
a =(Z'Z'(Z'X) (7)
IntheSCFwecanthenconsnctt =Za,andthenwe
can estimate the equation:
(8)
by OLS in the PSJD, yielding a consistent estimate for 6.
Obtaining, a consistent estimator for the asymptotic variance-
covariance matrix of 6 is somewhat moredifficult, and that
exercise is relegated to the technical appendix.'4
14Weshould note here, however, that (contrary to an
apparent claim in Angrist and Krueger (1990)), in. order to
construct a consistent variance-covariance matrix for 6 in the
simultaneous equations case where X is correlated withe it is
necessary that at least one of the two datasets contain
observations on all three of S, X, and Z. Since the PSID does
contain all three of S, X, and Z, we are able to construct a
consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix.
31Before presenting our results we shouldmention some
minor differences between the variablesand the samples in the
SCF and the PSID. In the SCF thedependent variable S is again
defined as log(WIY ÷ 1), but W isnet worth at the end of 1982
(rather than 1983 as in the PSID), and Y isnoncapital income in
1982 (rather than theaverage of noncapital income over the
1981-1987 period). As in theP5W, the SCF sample consists of
married households whose head is betweenthe ages of 30 and
40. In addition, to construct the W/Yvariable we had to restrict
the sample to households withpositive labor income in 1982.
For further sample restrictions,see the data appendix.
The results from estimating ôusing TS2SLS are presented
in regressions (3) and (4) of Table5. In general the results are
similar to those from theP5W, but the coefficient on income
growth is somewhat larger and morestatistically significant,
comfortably exceeding the 5 percent significance thresholdin
both cases. Thegreater statistical significance probably results,
in part, from the largersample size of the SCF dataset. As in
the PSJD, the OlD test reveals evidencethat the version of the
equation which does not include incomeas an independent
variable is misspecifled, butonce income is included (in
regression 4) the olDtestprovides no further evidence of
misspecification.
32Once the model has beenestimatedseparately in both the
SCF and the PSI]), it isa simple matter to estimate itusing the
pooled data from both datasets. Allthat is required isto stack
the data on S and t fromboth datasets and estimatethe stacked
system via OLS. Deriving consistentstandard errors isonly
slightly more difficult (again,see the technical appendix). The
results of such a pooled estimationare presented in regressions
(5) and (6) of Table 5. Asone would expect, the coefficient
estimates fall between those ofthe PSID alone and thosefrom the
SCF alone, and the statisticalsignificance of the coefficients is
greater than that in either dataset alone.
3.3 Evidence from the196142 Consumer &pendj.tureSurvey
The evidence from both theP511) and the SCF relieson
estimated income growth froma single data source, thePSID,
over a single time period, 198 1-1987.If this was an atypical
period for the relationship betweeneducation, occupation, and
income growth, our resultsTable 5 could be spurious. This is
of particular concern becauseextensive research in the labor
economics literature has found thatthe returns to education and
other observable characteristicswere changing over this time
period (see, for example, Katz andMurphy (1992)). Another
problem with the P511) and SCFanalysis is that neither data set
contained a direct measure of thesaving rate. To further check
33the robustness of the relationship betweenincome growth and
saving across households we decided to look at data fromanother
data source covering avery different period: the 1961-62
ConsumerExpenditure Survey.
In addition to covering a different timeperiod, the CEX
has the virtue of containing a directmeasure of the saving rate
for each household in thesurvey. Households were asked their
income, their consumption, and their saving for thesurvey year
and (unlike in subsequent consumerexpenditure surveys) a real
effort was made to educate households about the balancesheet
relationship between consumption, income, and saving. Asa
result, discrepancies between the quantity (income-consumption)
and reported saving are much smaller thanin subsequent
consumer surveys.
The chief disadvantage of the CEX is that itdoes not
contain any panel data on incomegrowth. We therefore
construct an estimate of predicted incomegrowth for each
household by looking at the income of households insimilar
occupational and educational categories who are fartheralong in
the life cycle. Carroll (1994) also used thistechnique and found
that income growth forecasts constructed in thismanner using the
PSID performed relatively well incomparison with actual
subsequent income experience.
The model of income is as follows:
34y1= [it1+ Age, "5J+U1 (9)
1
where y is the log of real labor income,D1 is a set of
dummy variables indicating household i'soccupation and
educational group, and Age1 is the householdhead's age. This
framework allows the estimation of a differentintercept rjand
growth rate 'y for each dummy variable j.Grouping all the
dummy variables for household i into a single row vectorD, and
grouping the coefficients y into a column vector, we have:
=D,r+Age,Dyy+ii. (10)
which can be estimated by OLS. Theprojected income growth
rate for household i is thus given by j =D1'i'.Theseprojected
growth rates cart then be used to estimate the CEX version of
equation (4). This procedure bears some resemblance to two-
stage least squares estimation, but differs because the value of the
income growth term g is never directlyobserved, even in the
pseudo-first-stage regression of equation (10).
The sample restrictions for estimating equation(10) were
similar to those used for the PSID and SCF.(For exact sample
restrictions, see the data appendix). In addition we had to decide
the appropriate restrictions to place on theage of the head of
household. In the end we estimated the equation twoways, first
restricting the sample to households whose head was between the
35ages of 30 arid 40 (as in the PSIDandSCF), and second
restricting the sample to households whose headwas between the
ages of 30 and 60. The expected result of the former technique
should be to produce the projectedgrowth rate of income only
during the early stage of the life cycle (henceforthdesignated
whilethe second technique should producean estimate of
the growth rate of income overessentially the household's
working lifetime (J.
Aswith the PSID, we present a simpleplot of the data
before we turn to formal estimation.(The same technique as in
Figure 7 was used to generate randomized predictedgrowth and
saving by group). Figures 8a and b plot theavenge value of
againstavenge saving rates for young households (with
heads aged 30 to 40) in the six educationgroups and the six
occupation groups in oUr sample. Figures 9a and bplot j
versus average saving for the same households. In all thefigures
there is a positive association between theprojected growth rate
of income and the saving rate.However, saving appears in these
figures (and in the more formal econometric resultsbelow) to be
more closely related to projected lifetime growth than to
projected current growth.
Our explanation of thispuzzle is that j is simply a
better measure of the predictablepart of income growth (even for
young consumers) than Intuitively, the quality of our
36estimates = D y, and i=Dm. will depend on the
accuracy with which and 'y are estimated. Thi can be
gauged by estimating equation (10) constrainingy to be zero and
comparing the results to those for the unconstrained estimation
described above. We performed such a regression and foundthat
allowing different growth rates of income by occupation and
education group (i.e. allowing a non-zero'y,,,,.) only raises the
R2 of the regression from .229 to .235;thisincrease is not even
close to statistically significant, having a p-value of .36. Of
course, this result does not imply that there were no differences
in income growth by education or occupationgroup for young
consumers in 1961-62, but it does indicate that the methodology
described in equation (10) was not powerful enough toreliably
identify whatever cross-group differences did exist.
The results for weremuch better. Allowing a non-
zero value of 'y raises the R2 of the income prediction
regression by about .01, an amoUnt that is statistically significant
at considerably better than the 1 percent level. It is our view,
therefore, that is a poorer estimate of the true income
growth rate than is g, even for young households.
We proceed now to the estimation of equation (4) using
the constructed values of and.Regressions(1) and (2)
of Table 6 repeat the experiment of regressions (1), (3), and (5)
ofTableS, regressing current saving on projected income growth
37and current age. As was true in Figures 8 and 9, saving is
positively associated with both measures of income growth, but
the association is substantially stronger withthan with..
Wesuspect, as implied above, that the apparent stronger
association with lifetime growth is merely the result ofsuperior
measurement of jrelativeto.Nelsonand Startz (1990)
have shown that for traditional instrumental variables estimation
a poorly performing first stage regression can generatepoor
results in the second stage regression, and we believe that the
poor performance of in these regressionsmay reflect a
similar problem here.
Regressions (3) and (4) add the log level of income as an
explanatory variable to the model, as in regressions (2), (4), and
(6) in Table 5.Theequation is now estimated using instrumental
variables, where the instruments are the sameage, occupation,
and education variables used to estimateequation (10).In
contrast with the results in Table 5,theincome growth terms are
not statistically significant once the level of income is controlled
for.
The final two regressions substitute the log of
consumption for the log of income, because under the null
hypothesis that consumers behave according to the permanent
income hypothesis, consumption should bea better proxy for
permanent income than is actual income (using consumption was
38not possible in the previous regressions because the other data
sets contained no data on consumption). Although the coefficient
on increases, it does not become significant. However, the
coefficient onreturns to near its level in regression (2), and
is statistically significant at the 5percentlevel.
Our conclusion from the CEX regressions is that the
positive association between saving and growth we found in the
PSI]) and SCF is not an artifact of the particular timeperiod
covered in those data, or of the particular measure ofsaving
used. The CEX results provide less unequivocalsupport for the
existence of a positive effect of growth on saving after the level
of permanent income is controlled for, but certainly do not
provide arty reason to believe that the results from the other data
sets were spurious. Finally, there is certainly no support in this
data for the prediction of the Permanent Income Hypothesis that
income growth should have a negative effect on saving.
4.Interpretation and Discussion
This section will consider whether any standard
modification of the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis
model is consistent with our empirical results. We focus here
primarily on the household-level results because we view them as
the simpler and sharper challenge to the standard model, although
we wifi occasionally appeal to the aggregate results to bolster our
39arguments.
To fix the analytical framework,we begin by showing
formally that the usual rational expectations LC/PIHmodel
without income uncertaintypredicts a negative correlation
between growth and saving, at least foryoung consumers. We
then consider whethermodifying the model to incorporate
liquidity-constraints, self-selection,precautionary saving, or
habit formation can potentiallyexplain a positive correlation. We
are able to find circumstances under whichsome of these
modified versions of the model cangenerate a positive correlation
between growth and saving, butnone of the modified models is
fully satisfactory. In the end, we speculate thata combination of
habit formation and incomeuncertainty may provide the best
explanation for our results.
4.1 The Life Cycle/Permanent IncomeHypothesis Model






where the gross interest rate P. =(1+ r), the gross income
40growthrateG=(1 +g),andinftialweaJthandincorne
Y1 are given. If there is no income uncertainty and theutility
function is homothetic, this model can be solved for theoptimal
level of consumption at age t:
C,=k[RW,1 ÷H] (12)
where H1 is human wealth and Ic is a function of thetaste
parameters of the consumer's utility function, the real interest
rate, and other features of the problem. Crucially, Ic is no:a
functionof 0. If the consumer faces an infinite horizon, the
expression for human wealth is:'5
(13)
The saving rate is given by:
=I'+ C
(14)
Suppose, for simplicity, that consumers begin life with
zero assets: W0 =0.Then the saving rate in the first year of
life is given by:







Thederivative of thisexpressionwith respect to G is
unambiguously negative, because k1 is positive andincreasing 0
decreases the denominator of the lastexpression. Interpreted in
terms of equation (12), the negative correlation between 0and
saving is due to the powerful effect of 0 on human wealth and
therefore consumption.
After the first year of life, assets will bea function of 0
and of past consumption. A thoroughanalysis of the problem
shows that among consumers witha high lifetime 0, young
households have a lower savingrate, but their elders have a
higher saving rate, than people of the sameages with a low
lifetime 0. The age at which thesaving rate switches from a
being a negative function of 0 to being a positive function is
dependent on all the parameters of the model.'6 This isone
reason we restricted our household-level tests of saving behavior
to young households, for whom the model'sprediction of a
negative derivative of saving with respect togrowth is
unambiguous.
16Note, however, that the derivative of the level of assets
with respect to the lifetime growth rate of income isnegative for
all age groups.
424.2 LiquIdityConstraints
We will first consider a very simple model of liquidity
constraints and show that it can reduce, butnoteliminate, the
negative influence of income growth on saving. We will then
examine informally a more complex model ofliquidity
constraints in which forward-looking consumers must accumulate
a down payment in order to purchase a house. We show that
such a model at least has the potential to be consistent with our
results.
4.2.1 Simple liquidity Constraints
Consider a liquidity constraint of the form W ￿ 0 vt.
Forsimplicity we will assume that utility is of the Constant
Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) form, although the qualitative
results do not depend on this assumption. For non-liquidity-
constrained consumers with CRRA utility of the form U(C) =
C1"/(l-p),the growth rate of consumption is given by:
___= (fiR)" co (16)
It is straightforward to show in this model that, for a non-
liquidity-constrained consumer who starts life with zero assets,
if co> (3,i.e. desired consumption growth is greater than
expected income growth, then consumption in the first year will
be less than income. Furthermore, in all subsequent years assets
43will be positive (indeed,theyare growing without bound). For
such consumers, therefore, liquidity constraints wouldnever
bind, so the same negative relationship between saving and G
derived above for the unconstrained LC/PIH model above will
apply.
If, however, co< G,then a non-liquidity-constrained
consumer with zero assets would choose to spend more than
current income; assets next period would become negative. If
such a consumer were liquidity-constrained, consumption would
be limited to current income, and she would enter the nextperiod
with zero assets, at which point she would faceexactly the same
maximization problem as in the first period, and would therefore
again be constrained. For such consumers, assets and saving will
always be zero, so the derivative of the saving rate withrespect
to the growth rate of income will also be zero. The "human
wealth effect" on consumption is zero becauseconsumption is
already at its maximum obtainable value.
The derivative of saving withrespect to G is therefore a
function of tastes, the level of 0,assets, and other parameters.
However, the derivative is always either zero or negative. At
best, therefore, this simple model of liquidity constraints could
explain empirical results in which the saving was unrelated to
income growth. It cannot, however, explainour empirical result
of a positive correlation.
444.2.2 Sophisticatedliquidity Constraints
Only a small fraction of total consumer debt in the United
States is uncollateralized. Of collateralized debt, the considerable
majority is for home mortgages. A more realistic description of
liquidity constraints might therefore be that consumers can
borrow, but only to finance the purchase of a collateralized asset.
Although we have not been able to complete a formal theoretical
analysis, it appears to be at least possible to generate a positive
correlation between saving and growth in a model in which
consumers purchase houses via mortgage borrowing. Two
assumptions are important for generating such a result: first,
collateralized borrowing must require households to accumulate
a down payment equal to some fraction of value of the house.
Second, the desired value of the house must be a function of
lifetime income.
The intuition for how such a model could generate a
positive correlation between growth and saving is simple.
During the first part of their lives, consumers save only in order
to accumulate the down payment for their home. Holding
income in the first period of life constant, the greater is G, the
larger is lifetime income. The higher is lifetime income, in turn,
the more expensive is the desired home, which requires a larger
down payment, which necessitates more saving.
We illustrate this possibility with a very simple model, not
45derived from a utility maximization framework. Consider a
consumer who expects his income to grow at rate 0 >1over
his entire 50yeareconomic lifetime (say, ages 25to75).The
real interest rate is assumed to be zero (that is, R=1). The
simplest possible assumption about consumption is that, in the
absence of the home-buying motive, it would be constant over the
lifetime (an optimizing consumer would chose constant
consumption if R =fi).Ifthis consumer were not liquidity
constrained, he would borrow when young, but simple liquidity
constraints of the kind described above would cause him to set
consumption equal to income over his lifetime.
Now assume that the consumer buys a home in the tenth
year of life, and that the value of the home is some proportion h
of lifetime income, V =hH1.Assume further that he
accumulates the down payment by depressing consumption by the
same amount in each year of the first ten years of life. Finally,
assume that, after the home is purchased, spending is elevated in
each remaining year of life by a constant amount sufficient, by
the last year of life, to have dissipated the wealth represented by
the down-payment. If the size of the down payment is given by
a factor d times the value of the home, the consumer's lifetime














and assets, which were identically zero in the simple liquidity




Since H1 is a positive function of G, it is clear that in this
model the saving rate for young households will be a positive
function of income growth, as will assets at every age of life.
Although this particular formulation of the lifetime consumption
problem is highly unrealistic, and is flawed in that it is not
derived from an explicit maximization problem, it illustrates at
47least a potential chamielthrough which income growth might be
positively related to saving. Whethera model with a realistic
lifetime incomeprocess and in which the timing and the
magnitude of housing purchasewere derived optimally could
generate a similar positive correlation isunclear, but could be a
valuable path for future research.'7
4.3 Heterogeneity in Discount Rates
One intuitive explanation for thecorrelation between
income growth and savingrates observed in household data is
individual differences in therate at which future utility is
discounted. Patient individualsmight be expected not only to
save more, but also to be morewilling to choose occupations in
which income starts low butgrows quickly.
This argument is not asstraightforward as it appears,
however. To begin with, itrequires that all young households be
subjectto liquidityconstraints (of the "simple" kind discussed
above). If there were no liquidity constraintsit would not be
necessary for consumers entering a high-growth professionto be
more willing to defer consumption. Eachhousehold could
choose, the profession or educationthat maximized lifetime
"'
Sheiner (1991), providesa complete analysis of this
problem, in which the size of the housepurchased and the date
of purchase are endogenous.
48earnings and could then choose the lifetime consumption profile
independently of the income profile, so there would be no reason
for patience to be related to income growth.
If all young households were pushingagainst liquidity
constraints, patient consumers would be more willing to endure
low consumption today in exchange for highconsumption
tomorrow, so there might be a correlation between income
growth and patience. But there would be no variation in saving
rates because they would all save zero. The correlation between
saving and growth would be zero.
There is a case in which the story can be made to work.
Imagine that there are two young households, one patient and one
impatient, and two occupations, one with a slow income growth
path that starts out high and the other with a fast growth path that
starts out low but has a higher present discounted value. Suppose
young households cannot borrow. Imagine that the impatient
household is unwilling to choose the fast growth occupation
because it would have to depress consumption for too long before
reaping the rewards of higher future consumption, but the patient
household chooses the high growth occupation. The patient
consumer could be so patient that he saves even given his rapid
growth path, while the impatient consumer could be so impatient
that he will be up against the liquidity constraint and will save
nothing, even given his slow growth path. In this case there
49would be a positive Correlation between saving andgrowth.
Support for such a story comes from Shapiro and Slemrod's
(1993) study of the effects of the 1992 reduction in income tax
withholding, which should have only affected the consumption of
liquidity constrained households. They find that expected future
income growth made it less likely that a household wouldreport
that it intended to spend the increase in its take-homepay.
Although a model like the one just described could be
responsible for our household-level results, it seems inadequate
as an explanation for our aggregate evidence on growth and
saving. While we cannot rule out permanent differences in
discount rates across countries, and are even willing to entertain
the possibility of exogenous changes in discount rates within
countries, we do not believe that the discount rate within a
country should be a function of lagged aggregate income growth.
Yet in our macro data we find that within countries increases in
growth lead to increases in saving. To explain this correlation
as resulting from discount rates one would have to postulate that
increases in growth lead to decreases in discount rates. We do
not find this plausible.
4.4 Precautionary Saving
All the foregoing analysis was conducted assuming that
the future path of income is known with certainty. However, a
50growing body of recent research has argued that income
uncertainty has profound consequences for the qualitative and
quantitative predictions of consumption models. One intuitive
result from that literature is that if consumers have a
precautionary saving motive they will be more reluctant to spend
out of uncertain future income than out of certain current income
(see, e.g., Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes, 1986). This should
reduce the magnitude of the human wealth effect on current
consumption.
More is required to explain our empirical results than a
reduction of the negative effect of human wealth on saving,
however: there must also be some reason for a positive effect of
growth on saving. The buffer-stock model of saving developed
by Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1992a,b) is promising in this
regard.Carroll (1992b) solves a model similar to that of




N is a lognormally distributed white noise error term, so that P
(permanent income) evolves according to a random walk with
drift. Income Y is given by P multiplied by a transitory shock
51V1. V1 is a mixture of two disthbutions: witha small probability
V1 is equal to zero (representingperiods of unemployment), but
if Vt is not equal to zero it islognormally distributed white noise.
Canon (1992b) shows that in this modelconsumers who are
sufficiently impatient will have a target wealth-to-income ratiow'
towards which their wealth willconverge.'8 At the target
wealthlincome ratio the personal saving rate willbe given by:
s= gw (22)
The derivative of the saving rate withrespect to the
growth rate of income is therefore:
=+ ___ (23)
dg dg
Unfortunately it is not possible to derive an analytical
expression for w*, so this equation cannot be signedanalytically.
However, Carroll (1992b) reports simulations of the modelover
a range of values for g, and finds that the relationship between
saving and growth is strongly positive for theparameter values
he uses.
18Consumers who are not impatient will accumulate assets
indefinitely. As assets grow large relative to income uncertainty,
uncertainty becomes less and less important, and in the limit
there is no difference between consumption in this model and
consumption in a model without uncertainty.
52The intuition for the positive association betweensaving
and growth is simple. If consumers desire to holda fixed target
wealth/income ratio, then if income isgrowing faster, wealth
must grow faster. To make wealth grow faster it isnecessaiy to
save more. An offsetting effect is that the target wealth/income
ratio is lower when income growth is higher (i.e.dw*/dg C0).
This is the human wealth effect on saving, andas above it is
negative. The simulations in Carroll (1992b) found, however,
that dw*/dg was quite small, so that onnet, ds/dg was strongly
positive. The human wealth effect is diminished in this model
because households are reluctant to consumetoday out of
expected future income if that future income is uncertain.
Unfortunately, even this model is not fully consistent with
our empirical results. Recall that the regressions in the PSID and
SCF were not of saving rates on growthrates, but rather were of
wealth-to-income ratios on growth rates.As noted in the
previous paragraph, even in the buffer-stock model the wealth-to-
income ratio should be negatively related to growth. Thus, the
buffer-stock model is consistent with the qualitative result that the
saving rate is positively correlated with the growth rate of
income, but not with our actual empirical result that the
wealth/income ratio is positively correlated with income growth.
4.5HabitFormation
53Again, consider a utility maximizing household, but
suppose now that utility is a function of the excess of
consumption over some habit stock carried over from the past.
The simplest such framework is one in which utility is given by
U(C1 -aC1..1).Muellbauer (1988) shows that if the utility
function is homothetic, consumption in period t will be given by:
(1+r)W +H
C1 =___________ + aC1(1—k) (24)
where Ic > 0, fl>1 are not functions of 0. Suppose
the consumer begins life with a habit stock C0 equal to initial
labor income Y0. Assume again that initial assets W0 are zero.
Assume, also, that income in the first period of life is given by
Y1 =rY0, but income growth is constant at rate G thereafter.












Using this formula it is possible to analyze the effect on
54saving of two separate growth experiments: increasing the rate of
growth in the first period of life, r, or increasing the rate of
growth over the rest of the lifetime, G. It turns out that the two
experiments have opposite effects: ds1/dr is positive, but ds1/dG
is negative.
The intuition behind each of these effects issimple. The
second captures the positive influence of human wealthon
current consumption, just as in the standard LC/PIH model
above. The first captures the fact that, given a previous habit
stock, consumption will adjust upward only sluggishly in
response to an increase in income. Increasing r raises income
in the first period more than consumption, and therefore
increases the first period saving rate. We call this the habit stock
effect.
If r =Gin the formula above, then underany reasonable
parameter values the total derivative of the saving rate with
respect to 0 is negative, because the human wealth effect
overpowers the habit stock effect. The assumption that income
grows at one rate in the first year of life and another rate
thereafter is clearly artificial, and was designed to provide a
tractable analytical example of how habit formation could at least
potentially cause a positive correlation between short-term growth
and saving. However, an income profile in which incomegrows
at one rate during the early part of a career and a different,
55lower, rate for the remainder is quite plausible. In fact, such a
pattern is a good qualitative description of our own data on
income growth from our household data sources.'9Rapid
income growth in the near future followed by slowergrowth in
the far future may also be a good description of theexperience
of households in rapidly growing economies, suchas the high-
saving East Asian countries examined earlier. In such cases, the
sign of the correlation between saving and growth will depend on
the relative strengths of the human wealth effect and the habit
stock effect.
The analytical formulas for the saving rate atages beyond
the first year of life are forbiddingly complex, so we resorted to
simulations in order to explore the model's predictions for the
growth/saving relationship. The first simulation assumes a utility
function of the form .U(C1 -aC.1) =(C-aC.,)'' / (1 -
wherepwasset at 4. The income growth factor is P for the first
10 years of life and 0 =1for the remainder of an infinite
horizon. We assumed an interest rate equal to the discount rate
at 3 percent. Our experiment was to compare saving rate
profiles for the first part of life when P =1.01and when I' =
' Infact, age-earnings profiles in the U.S. appear to follow
just this pattern. In the 1961-62 CEX, for instance, we found
wide dispersion in growth rates by occupation or educational
category for young households, but much less dispersion (and
lower avenge growth) for older households.
561.06.
Previouswork has argued that habit formationmay be
able to explain excess smoothness inaggregate consumption
(Deaton, 1987) or the equity premium puzzle(Constantinicjes,
1990) if the habit formation parameter a is at least .8. Ourfirst
simulations therefore assume a value of a =.8.The results are
presented in Figure 10 a and b. The top panel shows thepath of
income (solid lines) and consumption (dashedlines) under the
two growth assumptions. The bottom panel shows thepath of
the saving rate for the low growth (solid line) andhigh growth
(dashed line) cases.
The bottom panel shows that, for theseparameter values,
during the first ten years of life the avenge saving rate is lower
for the fast-growing household than for theslow-growing
household --thehuman wealth effect outweighs the habit stock
effect.Nevertheless, the results do represent someprogress
relative to the LC/PIH model, because thenegative effect of
growth on saving is much smaller than in that model.
The next set of simulations, in Figures 11a and b, repeats
the previous experiment but with a habit formationparameter of
a =.9.This increase in the strength of habit formation is
sufficient to retard consumption enough togenerate a higher
avenge saving rate for the high-growth consumer than for the
low-growth consumer in the first ten years of life, although
57saving is still lower in the first three or four years. A further
boost in the habit formation parameter to a =.95(not shown)
guarantees that the high-growth household has higher saving in
every year of the first ten years of life.
A value of a =.9or .95 implies that consumers care
enormously about how their current consumption compares to
their previous consumption, but carevery little about the absolute
level of their consumption. Although our intuition is notstrong
for what values are plausible, a value of .9 seemsuncomfortably
high. We know of little direct empirical evidence on the value
of a other than a paper by Dynan (1992) using foodconsumption
data from the PSID. She finds anupper bound of .667fora.
We should note that the shorter is the period of rapid
growth at the beginning of life, the weaker will be the human
wealth effect on consumption, and thus the easier it will be for
the habit stock effect to outweigh the human wealth effect. The
limit, of course, is the case presented analytically above, where
income grows rapidly only in the firstyear of life. If income
grows rapidly for the first 20 (rather than 10) years of life, even
with a =.95the correlation between saving and growth is
negative.
Our conclusion is that the simple habit formation model
can theoretically explain our empirical results, but only if we
make rather implausible parameter assumptions. The problem is
58that the human wealth effect is tremendouslystrong and tends to
overpower the habit stock effect unless habits are alsovery
powerful.
4.6Combining Models
In our discussion of liquidity constrainedand
precautionary saving models we concluded that, although both
were able to reduce the human wealth effect onconsumption,
neither provided a mechanism for producinga sufficiently strong
positive correlation between saving and growth. The problem
with the habit formation model was theopposite: a low initial
habit stock can justify a positive association betweensaving and
growth, but for reasonable parameter values the powerful human
wealth effect overwhelms the habit stock effect. It istempting,
therefore, to speculate about whether combining the habit
formation model with one of the other two models couldproduce
a fully satisfactory explanation of our puzzle. Unfortunately,
analyzing such models formally is beyond the scope of this
paper, but we do wish to indulge now in some brief speculation'
about the likely results from such hybrid models.
We do not believe that adding liquidity constraints to the
habit formation model would solve the puzzle. As in the analysis
of the standard LC/PIH model above, it should be possible to
split the population into those who are constrained and those who
59are unconstrained. For the unconstrained, the human wealth
effect on consumption would be undiminished.For the
constrained, saving would again be identicallyzero.The
qualitative result should be the same as in the LC/PIH model: the
negative response of saving to growth would be lessened but not
reversed.
We have more hope for theprospects when uncertainty is
addedtothe habit formation model. As in the usual LC/PIH
framework, uncertainty about future income shouldsignificantly
reduce the willingness of households to base currentspending on
expected future income.Uncertainty should also make
households more reluctant tQ consumetoday for fear of creating
a habit stock which might prove impossible to maintain in the
event of a bad income shock tomorrow. Increasing theexpected
growth rate of income while leaving intact the possibility of big
drops might therefore produce little effect on current
consumption. Given the current habit stock, however, the
optimality of slow adjustment of consumption to income should
remain, leaving the positive correlation between growth and
saving intact. We conclude that a model with both habit
formation and income uncertaintymay hold out the best hope for
explaining our micro results. To the best of our knowledge, no
such models have been formally analyzed in the literature to date.
Such an analysis would be a valuable contribution.
60Mother possibleway to reduce the human wealth effect
is to add bepiests to the model. If habitformation isstrong, a
faster growth rate of income might resultmainly in a larger
bequest to one's offspring rather than inan increase in
consumption during one's own lifetime.
5. Conclusions
We believe that we have established twointeresting new
empirical facts. First, at the aggregate level,periods of high
income growth appear to be followedby periods of high saving.
Second, among young households, those households whoshould
expect faster income growth appear to save more than households
who should expect slower incomegrowth.
Although it is possible that these two findings have
entirely different explanations, a common model which could
explain both results is highly desirable. We therefore considered
whether the most common modifications of thestandard LC/PIH
model, including versions incorporatingliquidity constraints,
precautionary saving, and habit formation were capable of
reproducing the observed positive correlation between anticipated
growth and saving across households. Although some version of
each of the models was capable ofproducing a positive
correlation between saving and growth,none of the models was
fully satisfactory. We speculated, however, that a model which
61combines habit formation and income uncertaintymay provide
the best hope for explaining our empirical results.
Returning to the topic of modelling economic growth, the
positive effect of income growth on saving has implications both
for estimating models and for the dynamicresponse of an
economy to shocks.In the limit, one could argue that the
common conclusion that raising a country's saving rate is a good
way to raise its growth rate is simply wrong. We do not take
this view. But the endogeneity of saving with respect to growth
does suggest that the estimated effects of saving on growthmay
be overstated. In terms of work (such as Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil, 1:992) that uses cross country variation in saving rates and
growth rates in order to estimate parameters of the production
function, this endogeneity problem means that the contribution of
capital to output (the exponent on capital in a Cobb-Douglas
production function) may be overstated.Without a proper
instrument for the saving rate, it is impossible to estimate the
true structural effect of saving on growth. Unfortunately, we do
not know of an eligible instrument. However, recognizing the
endogeniety of saving leads us to moderate the policy
recommendations that come from current growth models.
Recognizing the effects of growth on saving also leads to
a wide range of possible dynamics of growth models. To take
one example, a transitory, negative shock to growth may be
62propagated via a response of saving: lower growth lowers the
saving rate, further lowering growth. Such a description has
something of a ring of truth in describing the OFSCD in the two
decades since the OPEC shock.
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68Technical Appendix
This appendix describes the Two Sample TwoStage Least
Squares (TS2SLS) estimation procedure used for the SCF
estimates and the pooled scF/Psn)estimatesin Table 5.
Assumean underlying population in which each member i is
characterized by values for X1, Y1, and Z. Twosamples h =
{1,2} are drawn from this population; the firstsample
(corresponding to the PSIDinour empirical work) contains
observations on X, Y, and Z, but the secondsample
(corresponding to the SCF) contains observations only on X and
Z. The goal is to estimate 6 in an equation of the form:
(A.1)
in each of the samples. The usual Two-Stage Least
Squares (2SLS) procedure for estimating this equation in the first
data set involves estimating the equation:
(A.2)
X1 Z1cr+u
Under assumptions described below, a consistent estimator
69for a is given by:
a1 =(Z1'Z1)1Z1'X1
The 2SLS estimation is performedby constructing t1 =
Z1a1 and estimating the equation:
(A.3)
via OLS. The usual set of assumptions under which 2SLS





Consistency is proven as follows. Define '= X1-
Then:
Yitj3+u1t1ô+(e1+b)
Estimating equation (A.3) by OLS yields d1:
=(t1'1y' t1'y1=(t1'1)-'Z'(X16+ u1)
70= a +(1'k1)-' 1'u1
=ö+ (Z'Z)'Z1'(e1+ '6)
=6+ (t1'Z)'4t1'e1
where the last equality follows becauset' =0by
construction. d1 is a consistent estimator for Sbecause:
plim (d1-S)=plim(t1'Z1/n1y' plim (t1'e1/n1)
=010
where the fact that C) exists and is a finite matrixfollows
from assumptions (A.4) and plim (Z1'e1/n1)=0follows from
plim (4';/nh) =0.
Now consider constructing 2 =4 a1in the second data
set. OLS estimation of the equation Y2 =Z2S + u yields:
=S+(121t2)1 Z(e2+" 5)
plim(d2-S)
=plim(t2'Z/n2y' {plim t2'e2fn2) + plim (Z2'25 / n2)}
=plim(t2't2Iny'plim(7'e2/n2)
=0.10
Thusthe TS2SLS procedure of estimating the firststage
71equation in the first data set and the secondstage regression in
the second data set generates a consistent estimateof 8.
The asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the 2SLS
estimator is given by:
plim (dh- ô)(dh-6)'=0' plim (Z;;Z/nk) 0'
In the usual 2SLS estimation we observe &b ='4- Xdh.
If the errorsare homoskedastic, a consistent estimator of plim
(tb;;Xh mb)isgiven by c,b'hwhere5e,h= ;ednb.
However, in the second data set for TS2SLS we do not observe
X so we cannot construct éb. Note, however, that:
ee'=(u-vS)(u -
= uu'-vbu' -(vs5)'u+ (vô)(vâ)'
Assume that all of these terms are homoskedastic, so that
for any household i in either data set, E [u9 =o, E[v18 uJ =
aand E [(v18)1 =o, wherec is the covariance between vô
and u. The asymptotic variance-covariance matrix for db is
therefore given by:
plim (dh -ô)(dh-8)'
72= (o-2 cy +






andstandard proofsdemonstrate that plim= o, plim
=a,andplim= 4 Allthree of these terms can be
computed in the first data set, butonlythe first can be computed
inthe second data set (whereX is not observed socannotbe
computed).Suppose, however, thatthe numberof observations
inthe firstdatasetisa functionofthe numberinthe seconddata
set,n1 =kn2. Then define:
s,2[n2} = 2ü1'C'1d1/kn2 + (''1d1)'(c'1d1)/kn2
plims2[nJ =o-2;+




plim s,2[n2] (2't2/n' =(o - 2;+a)Li'.
In practice, the estimate ofthatwe use is given by:
=s-2s,1+s,
Pooled estimation using all the data from both data sets is




Thenestimation of d3 proceeds exactly in parallel with
estimation of d2 as described above, substituting the subscript 3
for 2. The consistent estimate of the variance of the error is
given by:
2_2n 5c,3 — 5u,3 — " 5c,1'
Theassumption of homoskedasticity is not essential. It is
74relatively straightforward to allow for heteroskedasticityof
unknown form in the u's. In practice theempirical results were
not much different when such heteroskedasticitywas allowed.
Furthermore, the heteroskedasticity tests reported in Table5
rarelyrejected the null of homoskedasticity, so we do notreport
the derivation or results for theheteroskedasticity-robust form of
the test.
The test of overidentifying assumptionsreported in Table
5isbased on Hansen's (1982) proof that the statisticê'Z(Z'ê
ê'Z'Z'ê should be distributed x2withdegrees of freedom equal
to the number of overidentifying restrictions.Although this
statistic cannot be directly computed in thesecond sample
because X2 is not observed (and so êisnot observed), it should
be asymptotically valid to substituteforê in the statistic
because plim (Z'b / n) =0.This is the test whose p-value we
report for the SCF and pooled regressions.
A note is in order about therelationship of this procedure
to the Two Sample Instrumental Variables (TSIV)procedure of
Angrist and Krueger (1990). Angrist and Krueger state that their
procedure can be performed on any two data sets such that, in
one, only Y and Z are observed, and in the other on1' X and Y
are observed.While it is true that their TSR' procedure
produces consistent estimates of the coefficient vector 8, we
believe that the variance-covariance matrixthey propose is valid
75only if plim (X'e/n) =0,or, equivalently in the notation above,
if; =0.(This corresponds to their assumption A2(i)). But this
is the case where simple OLIS estimationwould be consistent in
a dataset which contained both X and Y. Thuswe believe that
their TSW estimator does not allow for validhypothesis testing
in the usual instrumental variablescase where there is
simultaneity between X and Y.
76Data Appendix
This appendix describes the aggregate and the household.
level data sources and variables constructedusing them.
The Summers-Heston Data Set
Saving was constructed as follows:
say =1-(c*pcpcus +g$'pg*pgus)/(p*1O)
Where the variables are
c =RealConsumption (% of RGDP, 1985
international prices)
g =RealPublic Consumption (% of RGDP, 1985
international prices)
pc =pricelevel of consumption (100* PPP of
Consumption/Exchange Rate)
pg =pricelevel of public consumption (100* PPP of
government /Exchange Rate)
p =Pricelevel of GDP (100*PPP of GDP/Exchange
Rate)
pcus =pricelevel of consumption in the US
pgus =pricelevel of government in the US
The first five variables listed (c,g, pc, pg, and p) are
taken directly from the published data. The other two variables,
77which are part of the dataunderlying the published tables, were
supplied to us by Dan Nuxoll of the InternationalComparison
Project.
The Panel Study of IncomeDynamics
ThePSIDdatawere taken from Wave XX of the study.
The income variable usedwas pre-tax noncapital household
income, constructed by subtracting capital income fromtotal
household income. Capital income in theyears 1981-1987 in the
P&ID consists of the sum of interest,dividends, and rent for all
members of the household plus the assetportion of business,
farming, and gardening income. The income datawere deflated
using the PCE deflator with a baseyear of 1982. Our measure
of net worth was the sum of allassets minus the sum of all debt
reported in the 1984 wealth survey.
Wave XX of the PSID dataset contains data for8,129
individuals who were ever heads of households. Thesample was
restricted to households which fulfilled thefollowing restrictions:
The individual in question was head of the household in1981 and
1987, and there was no change in marital status between 1981
and 1987. The head was aged 30-39 in 1984. Validdata were
reported for occupation and education. The head was employed
for the whole year in both 1981 and 1987, andwas never self-
employed or a farmer.Educational status did not change
78between 1981 and 1987. Enough valid wealthdata existed to
create a measure of net worth. The householdhad never
inherited anything. The household did notreport exactly zero
wealth in 1984.
The 3-digit occupation code wascompressed into six
occupation categories20 in order to provide a smallset of
occupation dummies thatwouldbe compatible with the SCF data.
The eight education categories reported in the PSIDwere
compressed to six, also for compatibility with the SCF.
The Survey of Consumer Finances, 1983
The 1983 SCF contains data on 4,303 households. The
income variable we used was labor income of the headof
household. The wealth variable was total household net worthat
the end of 1982. The occupation and educationdummy variables
were constructed from the occupation and education codes
contained in the survey in order to be consistent with the
definitions of occupational and educationgroups used in the
Psm.
Our sample was restricted to households for whom the
following conditions held. The household head wasage 30-39
and was married. Valid data were reported for theoccupation
and education of the head, and the occupation was neither self-
employment nor farming. The head reported positive wage and
20Theexact mapping is available upon request.
79,salary income in 1982, and positive wealth holdings at the end of
1982.
The 196142 Consumer Expenditure Survey
The 1961-62 CEXcontainsdata on 13,728 households.
For estimating the wage equation (10), our definition of income
was total household noncapital income, given by total household
income minus interest, dividend, and rent income. Our definition
of the personal saving rate was the log of total disposable income
(total income minus total taxes) minus the log of total
consumption expenditures. Consumption expenditures in the
CEX include direct out-of-pocket expenditures for durable goods,
including cars. If the car is purchased with a loan, however, in
the year of purchase only the down payment andany loan
payments would appear as expenditures.21
Households which met the following criteria were
included in the estimation of equation (10). Valid occupation and
education data were reported by the head, who was neither a
fanner nor self-employed. There was no change in family
structure over the course of the year. The head worked full
time. The race of the head was white. Household noncapital
income was above the 5th percentile in the income distribution.
21 Werepeated the regressions of Table 6, but excluding
households who made car purchases, and found similar results,
although with somewhat greater statistical significance than the
reported regressions.
80The regressions in Table 6 were subject to twofurther
restrictions:The head of household was aged 30-39, and
consumption was above the 5th percentile in the consumption
distribution.The distributional restrictions for income and
consumption were imposed because otherwise a few outliers with




Dependent Variable: Average Saving Rate 1960-87
sample: OECD OECD Full Full
constant .168 -.530 .169 -.063
(.034) (.205) (.016) (.068)




Observations 22 22 59 59
.076 .400 .051 .205
Root MSE .0462 .0372 .0586 .0537
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. grow6O87 is theavenge annual growth of real per-
capita output over the period 1960-87. ln(y60) is the log of real per-capitaoutput in 1960.




sample OECD OECD OECD OECDFull Full Full Full
.172 .432 .367 .364.376 .528 .509 .439
(.124)(.136)(.150)(.153)(.090)(.079)(.092)(.084)
ln(y) .0287 -.0016 .0750 .1152
(.0076) (.0194) (.0072) (.0138)
time effects .000 .055 .000 .002
Observations 132 132 132 132 369 369 369 369
K2 .817 .837 .847 .846 .671 .757 .715 .768
RootMSE .022 .0208 .020 .0202 .042 .0358 .0388 .0350
Note:Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include a full set of country dummies.
The number in the row markS "time effects" is the p-value from the test that coefficient on
the set of included time dummies is zero. s, and & are average saving and growth rates over
five year periods.Table 3
Granger Causality Tests in Levels
dependent variable: s
sample OECD OECD Full Full
.473 .457 .482 .474
(.074) (.103) (.046) (.051)
.257 .195 .318 .268
(.109) (.149) (.080) (.084)
timeeffects: 0.354 0.009
Observations 132 132 353 353
P .869 .869 .810 .817
RootMSE .0186 .0186 .0308 .0303
dependent variable: &
sample OECD OECD Full Full
.232 -.060 -.059 -.239
(.090) (.105) (.068) (.065)
st_I -.259 -.082 -.117 -.001
(.061) (.073) (.039) (.039)
timeeffects: .000 .000
Observations 132 132 353 353
.248 .459 .149 .315
RootMSE .0154 .0131 .0260 .0233
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. All regressions include a full set of country dummies.
The number in the row marked TMtime effect? is the p-value from the test that coefficient on
the set of included time dummies is zero. s, and & are average saving and growth rates over
five year periods.Table 4
Granger Causality Tests in Differences
dependentvariable: 5t5'A
sample OECD OECD Full Full
.093 -.012 .118 .125
(.114) (.120) (.061) (.061)
.092 -.012 .244 .175
(.120) (.121) (.071) (.071)
time effects: .005 .001
Observations 110 110 289 289
.001 .100 .057 .105
Root MSE .0218 .0207 .0380 .0370
dependent variable: g-g1
sample OECD OECD Full Full
-.451 -.552 -.458 -.518
(.097) (.085) (.057) (.056)
-.0531 -.0514 -.0052 -.0067
(.0923) (.0842) (.0491) (.0483)
timeeffects: .000 .000
Observations 110 110 289 289
.198 .453 .185 .259
RootMSE .0176 .0145 .0305 .0291
Note: Standard errorsin parentheses.All regressions include a constant, but not country
dummies.The number in the rowmarked "time effects" is the p-value from the testthat
coefficienton the set of included time dummies is zero. s and g, are averagesavingand
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—10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Year51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 54 65 66 57 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 7576 77 78 79 80 81 82 53 84 85 86 87
Year
Fgure4
Saving and Growth inSouthKorea
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Agure6
Saving andGrowthIn Hong Kong
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Current Growth vs.Saving. ByOccupation (CEX)
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Lifetime Growth vs. Saving. By Occupation (CEX)
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Habit Parameter a =.8
Age 10 35 40 45 50 55 60
Saving Rate _____________ LowIncome Growth Consumer
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